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Very often, firms report earnings that meet or beat market expectation (MBE). In this study, we 
empirically document that managers are rewarded more cash bonus when their firm MBE more often, 
and this relation holds same regardless of the extent of managerial entrenchment. We find that stock 
market reacts positively overall when firms MBE, but it reacts less positively for firms with entrenched 
managers. The study shows that stock market is more sophisticated in rewarding firms for meeting or 
beating market expectation than a firm’s cash bonus system does. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive compensation has been the subject of extensive prior research. The majority of 
compensation studies agree that using stock and options in executive compensation can serve to include 
the market in accessing and rewarding CEOs. As such, it is relatively effective. However, using these 
incentives is not without fault, as evidenced by option repricing, backdating, or too little stock ownership. 
In their survey paper, Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) state that simple normative prescriptions, such as 
“repricings are an indication of poor governance” or “more equity ownership by executives is always 
better than less ownership,” are inappropriate. They argue it is almost always necessary to understand the 
objectives of shareholders, the characteristics of managers, and other elements of the decision-making 
setting before drawing any conclusions regarding the desirability of observed equity-based incentive plans 
or the level of equity ownership by managers. They call for a detailed contextual analysis to determine 
what relation between governance and compensation is appropriate and not misleading. 
In this paper, using firms’ meeting or beating market expectation as the context, we study whether 
managers receive financial rewards when their firms meet or beat market expectation (henceforth MBE), 
and whether one important aspect of managers’ characteristics: managerial entrenchment, moderates such 
rewards. We study how the market reacts when firms MBE, thusly examining whether shareholders 
benefit from MBE. As such, we examine how the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned due 
to management entrenchment and the use of stock and options in executives’ compensation package. 
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 The literature is mixed on how managerial entrenchment shapes executive pay. Jiraporn, Kim, and 
Davidson (2005) document a positive association between compensation and anti-takeover provisions 
(ATPs); a measure of managerial entrenchment. Fahlenbrach (2008) challenges the claims that entrenched 
managers design their own compensation contracts. He argues that corporate governance and firm pay-
for-performance may substitute for each other: if a firm has generally weaker governance, the 
compensation contract helps better align the interests of shareholders and those of the CEO. 
We examine executive compensation as a whole, as well as individual components such as cash 
bonuses. We find that managers receive more cash bonus when their firms MBE, and the cash bonus 
reward does not differ based upon whether managers is entrenched. There is some weak evidence 
showing that entrenched managers actually receive less increase in the total compensation (including 
cash, stock, and options) when their firms MBE more often. We find that shareholders experience positive 
abnormal returns in the short-run when their firms MBE. However, such positive abnormal returns are 
significantly reduced when firms have entrenched managers. 
Our study shows that stock markets are effective in rewarding managers’ behaviors and the use of 
stock and options in executive pay can be effective in aligning the interests of shareholders with those of 
managers. As such, we conclude the markets are relatively sophisticated in regards to this issue. We also 
further show that cash bonuses are not reduced in a firm with entrenched managers, even though their 
firms have less positive abnormal returns around the time that firms MBE. Thus, the cash bonus is less 
effective in incentivizing managers to maximize shareholders’ interests. Using cash bonuses as a 
component in pay-for-performance design is inconsistent with the notion of marrying managerial 
compensation to changes in shareholders’ equity value. 
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the 
paper and provides the policy implications of the study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The Financial Benefits of Meeting or Beating Market Expectations 
The typical modern executive compensation package includes both cash (salary and bonuses) and 
equity-based (stock plus stock options) components. In terms of cash bonuses, Yang (2006) shows the 
compensation committee places more contract value on above-target performance rather than on-target 
performance when setting CEO bonuses. Matsunaga and Park (2001) find a significant incremental 
adverse effect on CEO bonuses when the firm’s quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst 
forecast. They conclude that CEO bonuses provide managers with an incentive to beat analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Kim and Yang (2009) find firms often set lower EPS targets than analyst consensus to enact for 
the CEO’s bonus payout.  
Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2009) document “walk down” rewards and “walk up” penalties for analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings. In addition, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that executives who receive a larger 
percentage of their compensation via equity are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ quarterly 
earnings targets. Further, when target earnings are met or surpassed, stock prices increase (Bartov, 
Givolyb, and Hayn, 2002). The higher stock price provides executives personal profit opportunities by 
exercising their vested options or by simply selling stocks. Thus, we expect that managers’ compensation 
will be higher for firms who meet or beat earnings expectations more often. . Thus, generally we put forth 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Executives will benefit financially when their firms meet or beat expectations 
consistently.  
 
Since the cash bonus is often linked to the earnings target, we further expect the cash bonus to be 
influenced most dramatically, relative to other components of executive compensation. 
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 Managerial Entrenchment and Rewards when Firms MBE 
The relationship between managerial entrenchment and compensation is potentially complex. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) explain that entrenched managers can “reduce the probability of being replaced, 
extract higher wages and larger perquisites from shareholders, and obtain more latitude in determining 
corporate strategy.” The literature shows that entrenched managers (whose firms have high entrenchment 
index) are associated with more serious agency problems, poor operating performance, and lower stock 
valuations (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Core, Guay, and Rusticus, 2006; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 
2007).1  
Essentially, the entrenched managers face few disciplinary concerns and may thus be more likely to 
be motivated by personal rather than shareholders’ interests. Thus, if there are significant personal 
benefits to doing so, entrenched managers may be more motivated to meet or beat market expectation.  
Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2005) document a positive association between compensation and anti-
takeover provisions (ATPs), one widely-used measure of managerial entrenchment. Baik and Jiang (2006) 
find that managers can use management forecasts to dampen analysts’ expectations. Graefe-Anderson and 
Wang (2011) document that when the market consensus is high, a firm with entrenched manages is more 
likely to beat or meet the consensus.  
If entrenched managers use compensation to extract rents from shareholders with less chance of being 
disciplined, we would expect that the benefits they receive from meeting or beating market expectation to 
exceed those of unentrenched managers. . Thus, we have the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Entrenched executives will benefit financially from meeting or beating expectations 
more than their non-entrenched counterparts 
 
Fahlenbrach (2008) challenges the claims that entrenched managers design their own compensation 
contracts. He argues that corporate governance and firm pay-for-performance may act as substitutes. If a 
firm has weaker governance, the compensation contract may help better align the interests of shareholders 
executives. If Fahlenbrach (2008)’s substitution argument holds, firms with high entrenchment may have 
high pay-for-performance sensitivity. Then, when firms MBE, the degree of additional compensation may 
depend on whether shareholders benefit via increased stock values. 
 
Stock Market Reactions to Meeting or Beating Market Expectations 
Bernhardt and Campello (2007) find there are positive market reactions when a firm’s announced 
earnings surpass the market consensus. Thus, it seems the market considers firms beating expectations to 
be a positive signal. . To meet or beat market expectations managers often actively engage in earnings 
and/or expectations management (Matsumoto, 2002; Lin, Radhakrishnan, and Su, 2006; Bhojraj, et al 
2009; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). 
Some studies find that firms with entrenched managers, as measured by the number of Anti-Takeover 
Provisions, are less likely to manage earnings (e.g., Zhao and Chen, 2008a, 2008b). However, Graefe-
Anderson and Wang (2011) find that entrenched managers guide firms to MBE more often through 
‘expectations management’ and less through ‘earnings management’. 
The literature suggests that entrenched managers are associated with more serious agency problems, 
poor operating performance, and lower stock valuations (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Core, Guay, 
and Rusticus, 2006; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007).1 Thus, if entrenched managers are “playing the 
earnings game”, we expect that market reactions to meeting or beating the market expectation by 
entrenched managers will be discounted. Given these arguments, we have the following hypothesis. 
 
H3: The positive market reaction will be discounted when managers are entrenched. 
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 DATA 
 
To explore market reactions, we use quarterly data since earnings are reported quarterly. However, 
we use annual data to examine the benefits of beating the market. Data are obtained from IRRC, 
Compustat, ExecuComp, and IBES. We focus on firms in the S&P 1500, since this represents the overlap 
in coverage for the various databases. The data periods for each source vary and are detailed in Appendix 
1. 
Information on quarterly reported actual earnings is obtained from Compustat and is first used to 
compute the variable %MBE, which represents the percentage of quarters in a given year that a firm’s 
final earnings announcement exceeded the final analysts’ forecast consensus. We include %MBE with 
other annual variables such as managerial entrenchment, total executive compensation, total cash 
compensation, and other annual control variables. To measure managerial entrenchment, we follow many 
other studies like Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) and Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007), use the entrenchment index (EIndex) compiled by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009). 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the annual compensation data. We measure managerial 
benefit by both the cash bonus and total compensation for all top executives or the CEO. The average 
level of bonuses for all top executives is $2.16 million dollars, of which over a third is solely is attributed 
to the CEO. In addition, the average change in total compensation for all executives is $383,000. The 
equivalent number for CEOs alone is nearly $800,000. On average, firms beat the market estimate nearly 
three out of four quarters of the year. Note the median of %MBE is 1.00, indicating that more than half of 
sample firms beat expectations for all quarters in a year. On average, the sample firms provided a 14.02 
percent return to stockholders during the previous year. 
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 TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics on annual data used to test the financial benefits from meeting or 
beating the market expectation. BonusTop is the total bonus received by all top executives for the year. 
∆TotCompTopis the percentage increase in the total compensation reported for all top executives together. 
Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, the value of restricted stock granted, the 
value of stock options exercised, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation. BonusCEO is 
the bonus received by firm CEO for the year. ∆TotCompCEO is the percentage increase in total 
compensation reported for the CEO. All compensation variables are in thousands of dollars. We eliminate 
observations in which the CEO’s increase in total compensation is higher than the 99% percentile and 
lower than the 1% percentile. LnAssets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. %MBE is the number of 
quarters between firm general annual meetings in which the firm meets or beats final consensus analyst 
forecast. EIndex is entrenchment index, as developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Return is 
stock return observation year. BdSize is the size of the board of directors. %Outsiders is the percentage of 
outside directors on the board. BdHold is percentage of shares held by the board. Options is the natural 
log of the number of options held by top executives. Leverage is total debt divided by total equity. 
 
Variable N Mean Median 5% 25% 75% 95% 
BonusTop 2383 2160.770 1474.110 0 653.032 2738.426 6685.000 
∆TotCompTop 2383 0.383 0.086 -0.688 -0.257 0.546 2.344 
BonusCEO 2383 767.090 490.000 0.000 166.523 1000.000 2500.000 
∆TotCompCEO 2383 0.798 0.086 -0.788 -0.633 0.693 4.645 
        
LnAassets 2381 7.671 7.478 5.577 6.605 8.589 10.230 
%MBE 2383 0.724 1.000 0 0.5 1.0 1.0 
EIndex 2383 2.144 2.000 0 1 3 4 
Return 2383 14.018 6.946 -46.540 -16.758 32.146 89.177 
BdSize 2383 9.789 10.000 6.000 8.000 11.000 14.000 
%Outsiders 2383 0.655 0.667 0.363 0.555 0.777 0.888 
BdHold 2383 9.815 2.100 0 0 10.000 46.700 
Options 2353 7.399 7.386 5.609 6.714 8.146 9.209 
Leverage 2381 1.608 1.188 0.230 0.665 1.937 4.842 
 
 
PERSONAL BENEFITS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
We use two measures of managerial benefits, cash bonus and the total compensation for executives. 
We begin analyzing the possibility of differing levels of compensation contingent upon MBE with 
univariate comparisons. We segment the sample into firms with above- or below- average %MBE. These 
results are presented in Table 2.  
Panel A presents the results for all top executives, while Panel B report compensation for only the 
CEO. Total changes in total compensation and bonuses are significantly higher for executives guiding 
firms that consistently meet or beat earnings estimates. In total, upper level executives are paid over 
$700,000 in bonuses if their firm’s meet or beat estimates. This is logical, given that many bonuses are 
tied to the firm surpassing expectations. This corresponds to a more comprehensive increase in total 
compensation (which includes increases in stock and option values) that more than doubles firms where 
executives fail to meet or beat estimates. The results are similar when examining only CEO compensation 
as opposed to all upper level executives.  
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 In short, the results of Table 2 support Hypothesis 1 that meeting or beating the market expectation 
benefits managers personally through higher compensation and the rewards are reflected by both cash 
bonus and the increase in the total compensation. 
 
TABLE 2 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS: BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH BEATING THE MARKET 
 
This table presents univariate analysis on the sample, segmented by high and low levels of consistency in 
meeting or beating market estimates. Observations that represent high levels of consistency are those with 
above median values of %MBE, whereas below median values represent low levels of consistency. Panel 
A examines compensation for all top executives in total, while Panel B examines only CEO 
compensation. Compensation is defined by either changes in total compensation (included stock and 
options) or bonuses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: for all top executives 
 
% MBE Obs. BonusTop Diff. Inc. % MBE Obs. ∆TotCompTop Diff. 
0 1123 1787.212 
(63.104) 
 0 776 0.249 
(0.040) 
 
1 1260 2493.705 
(75.929) 
-706.493*** 
(100.089) 
1 1607 0.447 
(0.040) 
-0.202*** 
(0.060) 
 
Panel B: for CEO only 
 
% MBE Obs. BonusCEO Diff. Inc. % MBE Obs. ∆TotCompCEO Diff. 
0 1123 604.917 
(25.283) 
 0 776 0.679 
(0.120) 
 
1 1260 911.629 
(33.142) 
-306.711*** 
(42.452) 
1 1607 0.855 
(0.699) 
-0.175* 
(0.130) 
 
 
We also run two-way ANOVA to check whether the level of managerial entrenchment and the level 
of firms’ meeting or beating expectation interactively affect the cash bonus and the increase in total 
compensation. The interaction effects are insignificant, which suggests that entrenched managers do not 
receive differing levels of compensation based upon their ability to meet or beat earnings estimates. Thus, 
the preliminary evidence is inconsistent with the notion put forth in Hypothesis 2. However, we there are 
many significant influences from other variables that need to be controlled for. We now turn to more 
robust statistical methods of estimation. 
 
Multivariate Analyses 
To strengthen the results from Table 2, we turn to multivariate analyses, which allow for inclusion of 
control variables. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Benefit = α0 + β1%MBE + β2EIndex + β3LnAssets + β4Return + β5BdSize +  
β6%Outsiders + β7BdHold + β8Options + β9Leverage + βYear + ε 
 
Benefits is either the total annual bonus (Bonus) or the increase in total annual compensation for all 
top executives (∆TotComp) %MBE is the percentage of quarters between two consecutive general annual 
meetings in which the announced actual earnings met or beat the final consensus analyst forecast. The 
control variables include the firm size, entrenchment index, stock returns over the year, board size, the 
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 percentage of outside directors, the natural log of the number of options held by the board, and the 
institutional shareholdings in the firm. These variables control for important firm and governance 
characteristics that may also influence managerial benefits.  
Table 3 presents the results of the above model. All models are panel data firm random effect models.  
The anti-takeover amendment dataset from IRRC is unbalanced for firm year. Our annual data is 
also unbalanced. Some firms have more years in the data and some firms only have one year. 
Therefore, we apply a random effects model. Comparison between a random effects model and a 
fixed effects model shows that the random effects model better fits the data. Models with 
dependent variables ending in “Top” are the sum of all top executives, while “CEO” designations only 
refer to compensation relevant to the CEO. 
The control variables are qualitatively consistent with expectations. Larger firms and firms with 
higher stock returns pay higher bonuses and give higher pay raises. Executives’ option holdings are also 
positively associated with the bonus and increases in compensation. Boards with more outsiders are less 
likely to grant large bonuses or give large raises in the total pay.  
We now turn our attention to the primary variables of concern. The coefficient on %MBE is positive 
and statistically significant in all models, which is consistent with both the univariate findings and 
Hypothesis 1. As an example, consider Model 1. The coefficient of %MBE is 0.557, significant at 1% 
level. This suggests that beating expectations by one additional quarter during the year would translate 
into a 0.1393 increase in natural logarithm of bonus for top 5 executives (25% * 0.557). At the median 
total bonus for the top five executives of $1,474,110, this suggests an increase in total bonus of $220,333, 
which results in an additional bonus of $44,067 per executive. 
We add interaction terms to examine the incremental impact of entrenchment on compensation in the 
event of MBE. However, in each instance, when added, the coefficient is insignificant. This indicates 
there is no difference in cash bonus reward for MBE between the entrenched and unentrenched managers. 
Models (5) - (8) use the change in total executive compensation to capture managerial personal 
benefits, including stocks and options. In these models, compensation is measured as the percentage 
change from time t to time t+1, and %MBE+1 captures the %MBE in time t+1. We find a positive 
relationship between beating the market expectation and the increase in the total executive pay. 
The interaction item between %MBE+1 and EIndex carries negative coefficients. And it is significant 
at the 10% level coefficient in  all top executives  model. This result indicates that as the frequency of 
MBE increases, the increase in total executive pay reduces when managers are entrenched. However, the 
relatively low significance level, coupled with the insignificant coefficient in the Bonus model, makes it 
difficult to make definitive conclusions.  
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 TABLE 3 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: INFLUENCE OF ENTRENCHMENT AND MBE ON 
COMPENSATION 
 
Benefit is defined as the natural logarithm of BonusTop (Columns 1-2), BonusCEO (Columns 3-4), 
∆TotCompTop (Columns 5-6), or ∆TotCompCEO (Columns 7-8). % MBE+1 is % MBE for the next 
coming year. %MBE*EIndex and %MBE+1*EIndex are interaction variables designed to measure 
incremental influences. All models are panel data model with firm random effect estimation. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent LnBonusTop LnBonusCEO Ln∆TotCompTop Ln∆TotCompCEO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 2.624*** 
(0.243) 
2.596*** 
(0.258) 
2.210*** 
(0.241) 
2.162*** 
(0.250) 
-0.085 
(0.253) 
-0.071 
(0.265) 
-0.683*** 
(0.561) 
-0.768 
(0.593) 
% MBE  0.557*** 
(0.052) 
0.593*** 
(0.101) 
0.369*** 
(0.047) 
0.448*** 
(0.092) 
 0.043 
(0.080) 
0.042 
(0.080) 
0.048 
(0.178) 
0.044 
(0.179) 
% MBE+1      0.358*** 
(0.082) 
0.598*** 
(0.155) 
 0.347* 
(0.183) 
0.477 
(0.348) 
%MBE*Eindex  -0.019 
(0.039) 
 -0.036 
(0.036) 
    
%MBE+1*Eindex      -0.111* 
(0.061) 
 -0.060 
(0.136) 
Eindex -0.009 
(0.024) 
0.002 
(0.038) 
0.014 
(0.023) 
0.042 
(0.036) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
0.044 
(0.049) 
-0.044 
(0.050) 
-0.002 
(0.109) 
Ln(assets)  0.353*** 
(0.028) 
0.355*** 
(0.030) 
0.334*** 
(0.028) 
0.336*** 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
-0.014 
(0.061) 
-0.014 
(0.061) 
Return  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Board Size  0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.011) 
0.030** 
(0.012) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
-0.061** 
(0.029) 
-0.061** 
(0.030) 
% Outsiders -0.122 
(0.166) 
-0.132 
(0.169) 
-191.40 
(145.99) 
0.004 
(0.153) 
-0.357* 
(0.185) 
-0.345* 
(0.185) 
-0.931** 
(0.418) 
-0.918** 
(0.414) 
Board Holdings -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Options Held  0.149*** 
(0.029) 
0.150*** 
(0.030) 
0.119*** 
(0.028) 
0.116*** 
(0.029) 
 0.103*** 
(0.029) 
0.099*** 
(0.030) 
 0.372*** 
(0.066) 
0.371*** 
(0.066) 
Leverage -0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
         
Control Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351 2351 
R-square 0.353 0.357 0.319 0.318 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.026 
 
 
In conclusion, the results of Table 3 support those suggested in Table 2. Managers receive financial 
rewards when their firms MBE, which is consistent with the understanding that pay is often tied to firm 
performance However, we find little evidence that the level of entrenchment influences compensation. 
More importantly, in the one instance where we identify a significant relationship, it runs counter to our 
expectations. The weak significant and negative coefficient of the interaction variable indicates that when 
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 firms with entrenched managers increase the frequency of meeting or beating market expectations, the 
total compensation for all top executives actually increase by a less amount than if the managers were 
unentrenched. 
 
Market Reactions 
Lastly, we turn our attention to Hypothesis 3, which states that the positive market reaction to MBE 
will be lower if managers of the firm are entrenched. Specifically, we investigate the impact of 
managerial entrenchment on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around earnings announcements. 
CARs are residuals computed from the simply market model with CRSP Value Weighted portfolios as the 
benchmark. All stock price data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Following Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) and Bernhardt and Campello (2008), we compute 
two-day and 15-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (-14, +1)) respectively. The 
results are similar for two windows; thus we will only report the results on CAR (-1, 0). 
Table 4 presents univariate comparison. When the firm beats the market, the market reacts positively 
regardless of whether the managers are entrenched. These results are as expected, given the positive 
signal being sent, and is also consistent with previous studies. For the quarters in which a firm meets or 
beats market expectation, the high-entrenched group has lower CARs than the low-entrenched group for 
both event windows. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3. It seems the market discounts the positive 
signal if provided by a firm with entrenched managers. A potential explanation for this result is that the 
market recognizes such managers may be able to coerce deflated earnings estimates by either managing 
or manipulating earnings. It seems market can tell that these firms’ meeting or beating market expectation 
may be the results of managers’ maneuvers, as documented in Graefe-Anderson and Wang (2011). 
 
TABLE 4 
MARKET REACTION TO MBE WITH ENTRENCHED MANAGERS 
 
This table reports univariate comparison of market reactions to firms MBE, segmented by managerial 
entrenchment. CAR(-1, 0) and (-14, +1) are cumulative abnormal returns around the actual quarterly 
earnings reporting dates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Groups Beat=1 Beat=0 CAR (-1, 0) CAR(-14, 1) CAR (-1, 0) CAR (-14, +1) 
 N Mean 
(std err.) 
N Mean 
(std err.) 
N Mean 
(std err.) 
N Mean 
(std err.) 
Total 4565  0.0083** 
(0.0007) 
4565  0.0167** 
(0.0015) 
1744  -0.0098** 
(0.0013) 
1744 -0.0223** 
(0.0029) 
Low- Entrench 
 
1940  0.0103** 
(0.0011) 
1940  0.0199** 
(0.0026) 
786  -0.0075** 
(0.0020) 
786 -0.0190** 
(0.0043) 
High- 
Entrench 
 
2625  0.0069** 
(0.0009) 
2625 0.0143** 
(0.0019) 
958  -0.0117** 
(0.0017) 
958 -0.0250** 
(0.0038) 
Dif.   0.0034** 
(0.0015) 
 0.0056** 
(0.0032) 
  0.0042* 
(0.0026) 
 0.0061 
(0.0058) 
 
 
We also find that failure to MBE is met with a larger market decrease if managers are entrenched. 
When combined with the previous finding, this could suggest that entrenched managers are held to a 
higher standard, perhaps due to their entrenched nature. The market seems to reward such firms less in the 
event of a positive signal, but punish them more in the event of a negative signal. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines whether managerial entrenchment influences manager compensation when the 
firm meets or beats market expectation. In addition, we examine how entrenchment affects the market’s 
reaction to this event. We find that managers receive more cash bonuses from meeting or beating the 
market consensus regardless of whether they are entrenched. We further find that entrenched managers do 
not receive more increase in total compensation from positive performance. In fact, they actually receive 
a bit less in total compensation relative to their unentrenched counterparts. This is consistent with the 
findings that firms with entrenched managers experience a lower stock price increase following the 
positive signal of MBE.  
This study suggests the executive bonus system lacks sensitivity in relation to the level of 
entrenchment. The same does not seem to be true of the stock market, however. Rather, it appears the 
stock market is relatively sophisticated when it comes to distinguishing the positive information received 
from earnings reports. This suggests that, if possible, firms should avoid cash bonuses, and use stock and 
options as executive compensation more. Stock and stock options will better align executive benefits to 
those of the shareholders than the cash bonus. Using more stock or options may help reduce the weakness 
of cash bonus system, and therefore reduce the ‘earnings game’ in the Wall Street. 
 
ENDNOTE 
 
1. Straska and Waller (2010) show high ATP is good for shareholders when the firm is in disadvantage 
situation in merger negotiation. We believe this unique circumstance will not invalidate our use of APTs to 
proxy for managerial entrenchment on the general basis. 
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 APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
 
Data Source Time Period  
(In fiscal 
year) 
Variables Number of 
Observations 
Identification 
ExecuComp 1992-2005 Total number of options held by 
top executives; 
 
Bonus for all top executives 
 
Increase in TDC2 for all top 
executives together 
36178 Cusip6+fyear 
(fiscal year 
includes 
beginning 
calendar date 
and ending 
calendar date, 
taken from 
COMPUSTAT) 
IRRC-
governance 
index 
1990-2003 Entrenchment index 
 
19755 Cusip6+fyear 
(Stable, fiscal  
or calendar 
years make no 
difference) 
IRRC-
Director 
 
1996-2005 Board size, percentage of 
outsiders, board shareholding  
16019 cusip6+annual 
meeting date 
     
 1996-2003 Combined Governance file 8834  
     
Compustat 1996-2003 Quarterly earnings, stock price 60584 Cusip, 
quarterly 
reporting date, 
fiscal year 
 1996-2003 Quarterly file 8659  
 1996-2003 Annual file 2383  
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